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Through the years, use of antimicrobials in livestock has been the subject of an 
endless debate about the appropriateness of using these important medicines in the 
veterinary sector. This is a highly controversial topic involving ethical issues on animal 
welfare and human health, as well as economic interests by the pharmaceutical industry, 
the food industry and various professional categories, including farmers, veterinarians, 
pharmacists and researchers. As a consequence of all these factors, the debate has been 
often vigorous but not always scientifically unbiased. The aim of this lecture is to 
review the state-of-the-art on transmission of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) from pigs 
to humans with particular emphasis on specific risks that were overestimated by the 
scientific community in the past.  
The human health risks associated with consumption of pork contaminated with 
resistant bacteria are highly dependent on the bacterial species and the type of AMR 
involved. Historically, the main risks have been associated with foodborne pathogens 
such as Salmonella and Campylobacter. However, the public health burden attributable 
to AMR in these species is limited, since infections are generally self-limiting and, in 
most cases, managed without antimicrobial therapy. Moreover, resistance to clinically-
relevant antimicrobial agents is generally low among both porcine and human clinical 
isolates, although there are significant geographical differences.  
Pigs are also a reservoir of other types of resistant bacteria that may colonize the 
human body without causing disease, transfer AMR genes to the commensal micro-
biota, and eventually cause opportunistic infections by taking advantage of specific host 
factors such as immunosuppression, altered microbiota or breached integumentary 
barriers. Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) belong to this category. The risk of 
foodborne transmission of VRE was highly debated during the 1990s in relation to the 
use of avoparcin in livestock, which was banned in the EU in 1997. However, the use of 
highly discriminatory typing methods based on DNA sequencing has shown that the 
VRE lineages causing infections in humans are not epidemiologically related to those 
occurring in pigs and other types of livestock. Moreover, the countries where VRE are a 
frequent cause of human infections (e.g. USA) have never used avoparcin in livestock 
but have extensively used vancomycin and other glycopeptides in human medicine, 
suggesting that human use of these antibiotics is the main driver for the spread of VRE. 
In recent years, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and exten-
ded-spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Escherichia coli are the most important 
multidrug-resistant bacteria that have emerged in pig production. These bacteria are, by 
definition, resistant to cephalosporins, which are first-line agents in the therapy of 
severe E. coli and S. aureus infections, and therefore resistance has a considerable 
impact on morbidity, mortality and healthcare costs. Human infections caused by LA-
MRSA clearly originate from pigs but their public health impact is negligible in 
countries with high MRSA prevalence, and their widespread occurrence in countries 
with high pig production and low MRSA prevalence in the human population has not 
resulted in an increase of the overall mortality rate due to S. aureus infections, which is 
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mainly impacted by methicillin-susceptible strains. In these countries, the main impact 
of LA-MRSA is economic since their spread among farm workers has increased the 
costs associated with active surveillance and decolonization, and represents a potential 
threat to the sustainability of the national ‘search and destroy’ control policies. 
Notably, the risk that ESBL-producing E coli are transmitted by food is higher 
than for LA-MRSA, since this route of transmission is unusual and largely unknown for 
S. aureus. Furthermore, while LA-MRSA have limited ability to transfer methicillin 
resistance to other human pathogenic S. aureus lineages, ESBL-encoding genes spread 
by horizontal transfer of plasmids that can readily be exchanged between E. coli of 
animal and human origins. Consequently, foodborne transmission of ESBL-producing E 
coli is more insidious and difficult to assess and control compared to LA-MRSA, and 
the actual burden of human infections attributable to ESBL-producing E. coli of animal 
origin remains poorly assessed. Based on recent whole genome sequencing studies, such 
burden appears to be smaller than previously predicted by the scientific community, as 
confirmed by the low prevalence of the predominant ESBL type in pigs (CTX-M-1) 
among human clinical isolates and by the structural differences observed between the 
plasmid vectors carrying this resistance determinant in human and pig populations 
within a defined geographical area. Various modelling studies have estimated that the 
contribution of pork to human exposure to ESBL-producing E. coli is significantly 
lower than for poultry meat and beef. 
Other multidrug-resistant bacteria responsible for treatment failure and high 
mortality in human medicine, such as carbapenem- and colistin-resistant Enterobac-
teriaceae, are increasingly reported in livestock in some Asian countries but these 
bacteria are much less frequent in pig production systems in the rest of the world, and 
display significant differences in comparison with those isolated from human patients. 
In general, remarkable geographical differences exist in the prevalence of AMR 
resistance and such differences often, not always, reflect national patterns of antimi-
crobial usage. Accordingly, the type and extent of the interventions needed for preven-
tion and control of AMR are not the same for all countries. Each country should define 
specific objectives based on the national context, and develop an adequate action plan 
that is able to accomplish them in line with the available resources. Establishing 
national One Health surveillance programs is a good starting point to understand the 
complex interactions between antimicrobial usage and the occurrence of AMR, but 
adequate resources should also be allocated to ensure efficient communication and 
education of antimicrobial prescribers and users, effective infection prevention, and 
optimization of antimicrobial use, which in turn requires investment for updating and 
implementing national guidelines on prudent antimicrobial use as well as for developing 
new medicines, diagnostic tools, vaccines and interventions. 
